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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge: 
 
This is yet another Apprendi case. See Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). It comes to us in a novel 
procedural posture: (1) Apprendi was decided between the 
guilty plea and the sentencing; (2) the defendant clearly 
raised the Apprendi issue at sentencing; and (3) the 
defendant demonstrated what we find to be non-harmless 
Apprendi error. 
 
The defendant is Dean Henry, who appeals from the 
judgment of the District Court of the Virgin Islands which 
imposed a sentence following a guilty plea to a one-count 
indictment charging him with possession with intent to 
distribute 5 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Although Henry 
entered a plea to possession with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance, he has never admitted to possessing 
cocaine and it appears highly possible, in light of the less 
than textbook perfect police investigation, that the only 
controlled substance that he possessed was marijuana. 
Henry submits that both the identity and quantity of the 
drugs were elements of the crime that he was entitled to 
have determined beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, he 
contends, the District Court violated the teachings of 
Apprendi when it alone determined these issues (by a 
preponderance of the evidence) at the sentencing hearing, 
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sentencing him to the mandatory minimum sentence of 60 
months for cocaine base under S 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
 
The primary question on appeal is whether facts that 
determine in the first instance the statutory maximum 
under which a defendant is to be sentenced -- here 
particularly drug identity -- are elements that need to be 
determined beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. This 
question is governed by Apprendi and by our recent opinion 
in United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2001), 
where we held that the statutory maximum penalty that 
can be imposed on a defendant when drug identity is not 
known or found by the jury is one year, the lowest 
statutory maximum under the "catch-all" provisions of 
S 841. See Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 455. What the District 
Court (understandably) failed to appreciate (since 
Barbosa had not yet been decided) was that, like the court 
in Barbosa, it could not "unequivocally determine" which 
provision of S 841(b) to invoke without a jury determination 
as to the identity of the drug beyond a reasonable doubt 
because it "cannot simply assume that only [marijuana or 
cocaine is] implicated merely because the evidence was so 
constrained." Id. at 456. Rather, pursuant to Apprendi, any 
determination of drug identity in this case would be"legally 
significant because it [would] increase[ ] . . . the maximum 
range within which the judge could exercise his discretion." 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474. We thus agree with Henry that 
there has been an Apprendi violation, for Henry was 
sentenced to 60 months in prison after the identity and 
quantity of the controlled substance were determined by 
the sentencing court (by a preponderance of the evidence). 
 
Unlike Barbosa and United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 
93 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc), this judgment is not subject to 
plain error review, for an objection was timely made in the 
District Court. While the government is correct that the 
sentence imposed does not offend the 60-month statutory 
maximum for possession with intent to distribute 
marijuana, the District Court's error is not harmless since, 
under Barbosa, we cannot assume the identity of the drug 
merely because the evidence presented at the sentencing 
hearing was limited to marijuana or cocaine base. 
Inasmuch as the identity of the drug is relevant to 
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determining the statutory maximum, we cannot know 
which statutory maximum is applicable. Rather, we are 
constrained to evaluate Henry's sentence under the lowest 
"catch-all" maximum penalty of one year. Since his 
sentence exceeded one year, we cannot conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Apprendi violation was harmless. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment. 
 
Having concluded that the Apprendi violation was not 
harmless, we are presented with the novel issue of the 
proper disposition in a case where a defendant has pleaded 
guilty to the generic crime of possession with intent to 
distribute a controlled substance under S 841(a)(1) and all 
that is left to be determined is the identity and quantity of 
the substance. While the suggestion has been made that 
the Sentencing Court might make the determination 
pursuant to normal evidentiary standards (in contrast to 
the regime at sentencing, see Fed. R. Evid. 1101(a) and 
United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1989)), or 
even under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, 
Apprendi teaches us that "any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved[to it] 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 
(emphasis added). Although Henry does not desire to 
withdraw his guilty plea, consistent with the mandate of 
Apprendi, we will remand the case to the District Court for 
a determination by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt as to 
the identity and quantity of the drug possessed by Henry 
with intent to distribute. We see no reason why a jury 
cannot be convened for the sole purpose of deciding the 
facts that will determine the sentence. 
 
I. 
 
In 1999, a drug task force in St. Thomas comprising 
several local and federal law enforcement agencies, 
conducted an undercover narcotics and firearms 
investigation in an apartment project in St. Thomas known 
as Pearson Gardens. For the purpose of this investigation, 
the agents primarily relied on a "confidential informant" 
known as Ikal Stewart to conduct narcotics purchases from 
the targets while under audio and video surveillance. 
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The Pearson Gardens investigation commenced on the 
morning of February 17, 1999. Special Agent McCollum 
told Stewart that he was to attempt to purchase"crack" 
cocaine from Merlin Clark. Before Stewart went into the 
apartment project, McCollum searched Stewart, placed a 
recording device and transmitter on him, and gave him 
$500. Stewart was then dropped off near the Pearson 
Gardens complex and observed by task force agents, some 
of whom were in a surveillance van equipped with a video 
camera. Due to a failure in the video equipment, the video 
could not be linked up with the audio, and the agents had 
to rely on Stewart to verify the numerous voices that were 
recorded that day. As a result, the record of what exactly 
happened that day is not clear. 
 
Dean Henry is a lifelong resident of St. Thomas, where he 
is a self-employed taxi operator. Henry, who frequented 
Pearson Gardens, was present on February 17, 1999, and 
in the weeks prior to the investigation had sold Stewart an 
ounce of marijuana. On the day in question, Henry and 
Stewart held a discussion regarding the price and terms of 
a drug transaction, which was observed on a videotape 
made by Officer Manning and recorded via the transmitter 
device. Henry subsequently left Pearson Gardens for 
approximately 20 or 30 minutes, during which time Stewart 
was talking with two other investigation targets, both of 
whom were suspected of involvement in drugs. The video 
equipment malfunctioned at this time. When Henry 
reappeared, he and Stewart went into an apartment in the 
complex to conduct the drug transaction, but there was no 
video, and only unintelligible audio surveillance of these 
events. Henry, as well as another individual who observed 
the transaction, testified that the drug involved was 
marijuana and that Stewart secreted the drug on his 
person. Stewart was then observed leaving the apartment 
and walking toward the rendezvous area to meet McCollum. 
During this time he was out of sight for 4 to 12 minutes. 
 
When McCollum picked up Stewart, the latter produced 
a baggie with a substance that field-tested positive for 
"crack" cocaine. There is no evidence that any of the agents 
proceeded to search Stewart's person to confirm that he 
had no other drugs on him at the time. Stewart, however, 
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later admitted that he had hid some "crack" cocaine in his 
sleeve on that day in order to "lace" a marijuana cigarette. 
This obviously had not been discovered in the morning 
search. When the FBI subsequently learned of Stewart's 
behavior, they no longer considered him to be a reliable 
confidential source and sent him to California to enroll in 
a drug treatment program at the government's expense. 
Stewart has since left the program, and was unavailable to 
testify at Henry's sentencing hearing. 
 
Henry was charged in a one-count indictment with 
possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of 
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1) and 
841(b)(1)(B)(iii). He subsequently pleaded guilty to 
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). Under the law at the 
time of his plea, the identity and quantity of the controlled 
substance was a sentencing factor to be judicially 
determined by a preponderance of the evidence at a 
sentencing hearing. See United States v. Watts , 519 U.S. 
148, 156 (1997). Thus, Henry did not plead to any specific 
drug or quantity. Henry did offer to plead to one ounce of 
marijuana, but the government would not agree to this 
plea. 
 
Subsequent to acceptance of the plea, the Supreme Court 
held in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), 
that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." As a result of this 
decision, and prior to the sentencing hearing, Henry 
requested the District Court to empanel a jury to determine 
the identity and weight of the controlled substance beyond 
a reasonable doubt. He did not move to withdraw his guilty 
plea (and counsel stated at oral argument that Henry does 
not desire to do so). The Court denied the request, holding 
that Apprendi did not apply because a conviction for either 
distribution of marijuana or cocaine base would result in a 
guidelines sentence less than the forty-year "statutory 
maximum penalty" that the court concluded would apply to 
a drug distribution crime. Thus, the court held a 
sentencing hearing on May 23, 2001, resolving the identity 
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and quantity issues under a preponderance of the evidence 
standard. The District Court found that the substance 
distributed by Henry was 22 grams of cocaine base. 
Accordingly, Henry was sentenced to the "mandatory 
minimum" sentence applicable to distribution of 22 grams 
of cocaine base -- five years. See 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
 
This timely appeal followed. The District Court of the 
Virgin Islands had jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. 
S 1612 and 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review de novo  a District 
Court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines and the 
possible constitutional implication of Henry's sentence 
under Apprendi. United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 
861 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
II. 
 
We recently addressed the quantity and identity issues, 
respectively, in United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (en banc), and United States v. Barbosa, 271 
F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2001). In Vazquez we held that "an 
Apprendi violation . . . occurs if the drug quantity is not 
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
defendant's sentence under S 841 exceeds [the statutory 
maximum]." Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 98 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Barbosa we held that drug identity must be 
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt when the 
"defendant would be exposed to greater punishment 
depending upon . . . the identity of the controlled 
substance." Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 454. Although neither 
Vazquez nor Barbosa established a bright line rule that 
drug quantity and/or identity is always an element that 
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, 
inasmuch as both identity and quantity are relevant to 
determining what the statutory maximum is when the 
sentence imposed is greater than the "catch-all" maximum 
of one year, we conclude that, under Vazquez and Barbosa, 
Apprendi has been violated in this case. 
 
Barbosa involved the appeal of a man convicted for 
possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of 
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cocaine base and sentenced to 21 years in prison. At trial, 
there was a dispute as to whether Barbosa, a "swallower," 
intended to transport heroin or cocaine (he maintained that 
he thought he had swallowed heroin, but what he excreted 
following his apprehension was cocaine). While the jury 
found Barbosa guilty of trafficking in a controlled 
substance, the case was tried pre-Apprendi and the jury 
was not asked to make findings with respect to the identity 
or quantity of the substance. On appeal, Barbosa 
challenged his sentence based, in part, on Apprendi, 
arguing that the issue of which substance he intended to 
transport into the country should have been submitted to 
the jury and determined beyond a reasonable doubt. We 
agreed with Barbosa that drug identity should have been 
submitted to the jury, but we affirmed his conviction 
because, under the facts of the case, there was no plain 
error. 
 
In concluding that Apprendi had been violated when drug 
identity was not submitted to the jury for a determination 
beyond a reasonable doubt, we observed: 
 
       Congress separated controlled substances into five 
       drug schedules, which are updated and republished on 
       an annual basis. See 21 U.S.C. SS 802(6), 812(a). . . . 
       Congress . . . provided for several "catch-all" 
       provisions, all of which generally contain no reference 
       to specific drug quantity or drug identity, except by 
       schedule number. See, e.g., [21 U.S.C.] S 841(b)(1)(C) 
       ("In the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or 
       II . . ."); id. S 841(b)(1)(D) (". . . in the case of any 
       controlled substance in schedule III . . ."); id. 
       S 841(b)(2) ("In the case of any controlled substance in 
       schedule IV . . ."); id. S 841(b)(3) ("In the case of a 
       controlled substance in schedule V . . ."). The 
       maximum penalties under these "catch-all" provisions 
       range from one year (schedule V) to twenty years 
       (schedules I and II).  
 
Id. Thus, there are different "catch-all" maximums 
depending on drug quantity and identity. In Barbosa's case, 
we noted that "under the facts found by the jury, we [could 
not] unequivocally determine which of the `catch-all' 
provisions to invoke against Barbosa. Only under the 
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`catch-all' provision for a schedule I or II controlled 
substance would [his] twenty year sentence be within the 
prescribed statutory maximum." Id. at 455 (citation 
omitted). Since Apprendi requires us to analyze the 
permissible sentences authorized by the jury's verdict, 
which, in Barbosa's case, did not have any factual finding 
as to drug identity, we concluded that we could not"simply 
assume that only schedule I and II controlled substances 
are implicated merely because the evidence [presented to 
the jury] was so constrained." Id. at 456. Rather, since 
identity was not submitted to the jury, we held that 
Barbosa's twenty-year sentence "far exceeded the statutory 
maximums under the potentially applicable `catch-all' 
provisions . . . ." Id. In particular, not knowing the identity 
of the drug, we concluded that the only "catch-all" 
maximum penalty that could be imposed on Barbosa was 
one year -- the lowest statutory maximum under the 
"catch-all" provisions. See 21 U.S.C.S 841(b)(3). 
 
Recognizing that prior cases had concluded that drug 
identity was a sentencing factor, not an element of the 
crime that had to be submitted to the jury, we did not go 
so far as to decide that identity is always an element. Cf. 
Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 108 (Becker, C.J., concurring) 
("[D]rug type and quantity are always elements of an 
offense under S 84, and therefore must always be 
submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.") (emphasis in original). Rather, we reaffirmed that 
"even after Apprendi, drug identity will not always be an 
element of a S 841(a) offense. . . . So long as the resulting, 
and possibly enhanced, sentence is below the statutory 
maximum authorized by the jury's factual findings , no 
Apprendi problem exists." Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 456-57 
(emphasis added). However, what we did conclude in 
Barbosa is that in cases where drug identity is not known 
or found by the jury, "drug identity would not be an 
element [only] in those cases where the sentence imposed 
is below the lowest `catch-all' maximum of one year found 
in S 841(b)(3) . . . ." Id. at 457. This result was driven by 
our observation that, without a jury determination on the 
particular substance, we cannot assume the identity and, 
thereby, the provision under which the individual should be 
sentenced. Thus, the rule of Barbosa is that when the jury's 
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factual findings do not include a finding as to the identity 
of the drug beyond a reasonable doubt, Apprendi  will be 
violated when the sentence exceeds the lowest "catch-all" 
statutory maximum of one year. See 21 U.S.C.S 841(b)(3). 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
In this case, as in Barbosa, an Apprendi  violation has 
occurred because Henry was convicted without having the 
identity of the drug determined by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the sentence that Henry received 
exceeds one year, the lowest statutory maximum "under the 
potentially applicable `catch-all' provision[ ] . . . ." Barbosa, 
271 F.3d at 456. Henry pleaded guilty to S 841(a)(1), 
possession of a controlled substance, but did not plead to 
any particular substance. The government points out that 
Henry "expressly admitted" to marijuana during the plea 
colloquy; however we decline to adjudicate this appeal as if 
Henry pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 
marijuana. Henry's counsel stated to the Court that"[i]t is 
the defendant's position that the substance involved was 
marijuana," and that he was pleading guilty only to the 
crime as alleged in Count 1, which did not reference any 
particular substance.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The plea colloquy makes clear not only that Henry maintained that he 
was in possession of marijuana, not cocaine, but also that he did not 
plead to any particular substance: 
 
       HENRY'S COUNSEL: Your Honor . . . Mr. Henry is pleading guilty 
       to possession with intent to distribute a 
       controlled substance. There is a disagreement 
       between the Government and the Defendant 
       as to exactly what that substance was and 
       the weight and quality of it. It is the 
       Defendant's position that the substance 
       involved was marijuana, and it's his intent to 
       plead guilty to the crime as alleged in Count 
       1. But he does disagree as to the substance, 
       Your Honor. 
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We acknowledge that a lay reader may wonder what the 
harm would be in evaluating this appeal as if Henry had 
pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 
marijuana since Henry expressly argued that the substance 
was marijuana. However, while Henry has always 
maintained that he possessed marijuana and not cocaine, 
his admission does not change the fact that Henry did not 
plead guilty to possession with intent to distribute 
marijuana. There is no indication that he was charged 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       GOV'T COUNSEL: Your Honor, it appears -- and this is discussion 
       [sic] that defense counsel and the Government 
       would have -- is that under the Third Circuit 
       and other circuits the identity as well as the 
       quantity of this controlled substance is a 
       sentencing factor, so that the determination of 
       what the substance is is made by the 
       sentencing court as a matter of the Court's 
       decision and not the jury. So that the Defendant 
       would be pleading to possession of a controlled 
       substance. . . . 
 
       *** 
 
       COURT: Mr. Henry, do you agree the Government could prove the 
       facts against you as stated by [the government's attorney], 
       with the exception of the identity of the substance? 
 
       *** 
 
       COURT: [T]he issue of what that substance was will be, of course, 
       reserved for sentencing. . . . 
 
       COURT: . . . Now, I'm going to read the Indictment and after I have 
       read it, I'm going to ask how you plead to it, guilty or not 
       guilty? And I'm going to omit the portion of the Indictment 
       which identifies the substance. Now, the Grand Jury 
       charges that this Count 1, on or about February 17 of 
       1999, at St. Thomas, in the District of the Virgin Islands, 
       the Defendant Dean "Ras" Henry, did knowingly and 
       intentionally possess with intent to distribute a controlled 
       substance in violation of Title 21 of the U.S. Code, Section 
       841(a)(1) and as follows: Mr. Henry, how do you plead to 
       the charge, guilty or not guilty? 
 
       HENRY: Guilty. 
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under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(D), the provision for marijuana. 
Henry's admission, in and of itself, cannot be deemed a 
plea of guilty to the crime when he was never charged with 
that crime, especially since the government maintains that 
he is not guilty of that crime, but of the crime of possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine. Criminal trials are 
governed by rules and, thus, we cannot always bow to 
practical realities. Rather, in this case, we are constrained 
by the rule of Barbosa that when there is no finding beyond 
a reasonable doubt or stipulation as to the controlled 
substance, the court cannot simply assume the substance 
is of a particular kind. Moreover, the District Court stated 
explicitly that it was omitting any reference to drug identity 
when it read the Indictment to which Henry pleaded guilty. 
See supra note 1. 
 
In sum, for purposes of analyzing this appeal, we dismiss 
any argument that Henry actually pleaded guilty to 
possession with intent to distribute marijuana. This 
conclusion is bolstered by the District Court's statement in 
its order denying Henry's request to apply Apprendi, stating 
that it "accepted Henry's plea of guilty to the generic section 
841(a)(1) violation of knowingly and intentionally possessing 
with the intent to distribute an unidentified substance" 
(emphasis added).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Were we to conclude that Henry pleaded guilty to possession of 
marijuana, we would know the applicable statutory maximum and would 
be able to determine whether he received a sentence that exceeded that 
maximum. Moreover, if Henry had pleaded guilty to possession of 
marijuana, Apprendi would not be implicated since the 60-month 
sentence that Henry received is no more than the statutory maximum 
allowed for marijuana under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(D). See, e.g., Edwards 
v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998) (upholding sentence where jury did 
not determine the identity of the substance since the sentence imposed 
was within the lowest statutory maximum which would apply to either 
substance at issue); United States v. Williams , 235 F.3d 858 (3d Cir. 
2000) (holding it to be irrelevant that the court determined a fact that 
increased the statutory maximum when the actual sentence imposed 
was below the original statutory maximum). To be sure, a 60-month 
sentence for possession with intent to distribute marijuana under 21 
U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(D) might constitute error under the Sentencing 
Guidelines in a case such as this, where the sentence is outside the 
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B. 
 
Not knowing the identity or quantity of the substance, 
the District Court proceeded to conclude that Apprendi did 
not apply because it determined that "[t]he range of 
punishment facing Henry for conviction under section 
841(a)(1) extends from a statutory maximum penalty of five 
years imprisonment and a fine for five grams or more of 
marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(D), to a statutory 
maximum of forty years, with a mandatory minimum of five 
years, and a fine for five grams or more of cocaine base, see 
21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)." The District Court relied on 
United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858 (3d Cir. 2000), 
which held that, post-Apprendi, it is up to the judge to 
determine the applicable statutory range by applying the 
sentencing guidelines, and that Apprendi is not violated as 
long as that range does not exceed the statutory maximum. 
Applying Williams, the District Court concluded that 
Apprendi was not implicated in this case because the 
Guideline range "as calculated in the presentence report for 
Mr. Henry does not and cannot exceed the statutory 
maximum of forty years," which is the statutory maximum 
applicable to possession with intent to distribute cocaine 
base under S 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). The District Court proceeded 
to determine the identity of the substance by a 
preponderance of the evidence, which is the appropriate 
standard that applies at a sentencing hearing. See United 
States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) ("The Guidelines 
state that it is `appropriate' that facts relevant to sentencing 
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, USSG 
S 6A1.3 comment, and we have held that application of the 
preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies 
due process."). 
 
The teachings of Williams, however, are not applicable 
since we are not dealing with the District Court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
applicable guideline range, notwithstanding the fact that Apprendi would 
not be implicated. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 5K2.O. 
However, it is precisely because we do not know the identity of the drug, 
and, thus, the applicable statutory maximum in the first place, that 
Apprendi is implicated in this case. 
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sentencing within a guideline range below a known 
statutory maximum. Indeed, post-Apprendi,"a District 
Court's sentence that is under the statutory maximum 
cannot be constitutionally objectionable under Apprendi." 
Williams, 235 F.3d at 863. In this case, however, any 
determination on drug identity would be "legally significant 
because it [would] increase[ ] . . . the maximum range 
within which the judge could exercise his discretion." 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474. 
 
As we noted in Barbosa, "Apprendi compels us to focus 
on the permissible sentences authorized by the jury's 
verdict." 271 F.3d at 456 (emphasis added). Unlike 
Williams, where the parties stipulated to the identity and 
quantity of the drug, there was no such agreement in this 
case. See Williams, 235 F.3d at 859. Henry's plea was only 
to S 841(a)(1), the generic section for possession of a 
controlled substance. Thus, since drug identity was not 
determined beyond a reasonable doubt in this case, and 
Henry was sentenced to 5 years, which is greater than the 
lowest "catch-all" maximum of one year, under Barbosa 
there is an Apprendi violation. 
 
C. 
 
We have previously concluded that an Apprendi  error is 
not a structural defect, but instead, is subject to harmless 
or plain error analysis, depending upon the presence of an 
objection at trial. Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 103. If the 
defendant objects at trial, we review for harmless error. 
Since Henry raised the Apprendi issue at sentencing, we 
must determine, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 52(a), 
whether the error is harmless. See Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 52(a) "by its terms 
applies to all errors where a proper objection is made at 
trial."). Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 52(a) provides that"Any error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded." 
 
In Apprendi, the "Supreme Court recognized a new 
constitutional right grounded in the Due Process Clause 
and the Sixth Amendment's notice and jury trial 
guarantees." Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 101. Thus, to determine 
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whether the error was harmless, we apply the 
constitutional harmless error analysis set forth in Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), and ask "whether it 
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 
Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 459 (citation omitted). The 
government bears the burden of persuasion. See Chapman, 
386 U.S. at 24. A court should not find harmless error if "at 
the end of the examination [of the record],[we] cannot 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict 
would have been the same absent error." Neder , 527 U.S. at 
15. 
 
The government submits, and we agree, that the 
statutory maximum sentence that Henry would have faced 
had the District Court determined that he possessed with 
intent to distribute marijuana would have been 60 months 
under S 841(b)(1)(D). It is also true that Henry was, in fact, 
sentenced to 60 months. As a result, the government 
argues that there is no harm since Henry's sentence did not 
exceed the lowest statutory maximum sentence that would 
apply to either marijuana or cocaine. For this proposition, 
the government relies on Edwards v. United States, 523 
U.S. 511 (1998), where the Supreme Court upheld the 
judge's power to make a determination under the 
sentencing guidelines with respect to drug identity when 
the sentence imposed is within the lowest statutory 
maximum which would apply under either of two possible 
drug substances. 
 
We find, however, that Edwards is inapplicable to this 
case. In Edwards, the District Court instructed the jury 
that "the government must prove that the conspiracy . . . 
involved measurable amounts of cocaine or cocaine base." 
Id. at 513. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. By 
so doing, the jury necessarily determined that the 
government had proven that the conspiracy involved 
cocaine or cocaine base. In this case, by contrast, there was 
no such determination, by a judge or a jury, with respect to 
the identity of the substance. Thus, when the judge 
sentenced the defendants in Edwards based on his finding 
that the illegal conduct involved both cocaine and cocaine 
base and the sentence imposed fell within the lower 
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statutory maximum for cocaine, there was no error since 
the element of drug identity had necessarily been 
determined by the jury. Since there was no such 
determination in this case, we fail to see how Edwards is 
controlling. 
 
Moreover, we find the inquiry advanced by the 
government to be foreclosed by Barbosa. We cannot 
assume, simply because the evidence presented to the 
District Court was so limited, that the drug was either 
marijuana or cocaine. See Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 456 
("[B]ecause the identity of the drug was not submitted to 
the jury, we cannot simply assume that only schedule I and 
II controlled substances are implicated merely because the 
evidence was so constrained.").3 Moreover, if the substance 
were marijuana, under all the relevant and applicable 
factors under the sentencing guidelines, the maximum 
sentence that Henry would have faced would have been six 
months. As the government acknowledged at oral 
argument, it is inconceivable that Henry would have 
received a 60-month Guidelines sentence in this case if 
drug quantity was one ounce of marijuana given his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In Barbosa, reviewing under the plain error standard under Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 52(b), where the defendant bears the burden of persuasion, we 
affirmed his conviction. We found that "Barbosa[could not] show that 
the error affected his substantial rights. The evidence established 
indisputably, and certainly beyond a reasonable doubt, that Barbosa 
possessed with the intent to distribute 882 grams of a controlled 
substance and that this controlled substance was cocaine base." 
Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 460. The inquiry under Barbosa was quite different 
from the inquiry we are presented with here. In Barbosa, although the 
jury was not asked to determine beyond a reasonable doubt the identity 
of the substance, it was presented with a great deal of evidence with 
respect to the identity of the drug. Noting that"[i]ndeed, cocaine base 
and heroin were the only controlled substances presented to the jury 
through the evidence at trial, the former through the testimony of the 
DEA forensic chemist," we proceeded to conclude that, "[n]onetheless, we 
may confidently infer that the jury, in convicting Barbosa and rejecting 
the entrapment defense, necessarily found the controlled substance to be 
cocaine base." Id. at 460. We also concluded that "a defendant who is in 
actual possession of a particular controlled substance, while intending to 
distribute another, may be punished for the drug with which he is found 
to be in possession." Id. at 459. Thus, intent is irrelevant. 
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criminal history score of 1. Under the Guidelines Manual, 
these factors result in a punishment range of zero to six 
months. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
S 2D1.1(c)(17) (2000) (classifying the offense level as 6); U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual Sentencing Table (2000) 
(diagraming sentences based on offense level and criminal 
history). The District Court's conclusion that the substance 
was cocaine meant that Henry was subject to a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 60 months. Thus, the mere fact that 
Henry received a sentence that did not exceed the statutory 
maximum for marijuana does not render the error harmless 
in this case. 
 
D. 
 
To recapitulate, we conclude that the error in this case 
was not harmless because we cannot say beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Henry would have received a 60- 
month sentence if the quantity and identity of the 
substance had been determined by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. No evidence was presented to a jury for 
a determination of the identity and quantity issues. Rather, 
the evidence of drug identity and quantity was presented to 
the judge during the sentencing hearing and the 
determination was made by a preponderance of the 
evidence. We also note that, under the circumstances, the 
rules of evidence did not apply. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3). 
This raises the further complication of evaluating whether 
there was sufficient evidence that would have led a jury to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance 
was cocaine, since it is not clear that the evidence 
presented to the District Court met the standard of 
admissibility of evidence presented to a jury for a 
determination beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Two additional points buttress our conclusion. First, 18 
U.S.C. S 3661 prohibits any "limitation . .. on the [kind] of 
information" a sentencing court may consider about the 
defendant's "background, character and conduct." Thus, 
what the Court considered at the sentencing hearing could 
have encompassed information that would otherwise be 
inadmissible if presented to a jury. Second, the District 
Court stated during the sentencing hearing that it did not 
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think that the government had established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the substance was cocaine, rather 
than marijuana. 
 
IV. 
 
Having concluded that there was an Apprendi violation 
that was not harmless error, we are presented with the 
novel issue of the proper remedy in such a case (where the 
defendant pleaded guilty to the general crime). Apprendi 
teaches us that "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added). We find 
it consistent with the mandate of Apprendi to remand for a 
jury to determine these facts beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This is what Henry requested in the District Court. We see 
no reason why a jury cannot be convened for the sole 
purpose of deciding the facts that will determine the 
sentence. After all, that is the job of the jury as fact-finder. 
 
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the District 
Court will be vacated and the case remanded to that Court 
for a determination by a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
as to the identity and quantity of the drug possessed by 
Henry with intent to distribute, and then for resentencing. 
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